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he European Union relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for 
natural gas. In 2012, the EU consumed approximately 444 bcm of gas, of which about two-
thirds (or about 294 bcm) was imported from non-EU countries, mainly in the form of 
piped gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, e.g. 
the Langeled pipeline transporting gas to the UK, a major share of Russian gas flows through the 
territories of non-EU member states, namely Belarus and Ukraine, before reaching consumers 
located in the EU.  
From an exporter’s standpoint, gas transit is problematic for two major reasons. First, the 
producer (e.g. Gazprom or Sonatrach) has to pay a transit fee to the government of the transit 
country. Second, gas transit carries risks. Transit countries (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine or Tunisia) often 
receive their own gas deliveries through the same pipelines that are used to transport gas to other 
consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Poland, Slovakia or Italy). Therefore, a 
suspension of gas supplies to one of the transit countries could negatively affect gas flows to 
other countries.  
In 2009, a gas dispute between Moscow and Kyiv led to a suspension of Russian gas deliveries to 
Ukraine. This crisis resulted in supply disruptions in 12 EU member states. Not surprisingly, the 
mounting tension between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimean Peninsula has revived the 
ghosts from the past. Is there a real prospect that a crisis of the same magnitude might again 
erupt? Probably not. 
According to a 2009 European Commission Staff Working Document (European Commission, 
2009), about 80% of Russian gas exports to the EU that year transited through Ukraine. And even 
today, the Ukrainian gas transmission system (GTS) remains the main supply corridor for 
Russian gas flowing into the EU, as shown in the figure below.  
The picture is becoming more complicated today, however, as a result of several developments, 
and a (potential) suspension of Russian supplies to Ukraine would have a limited effect on EU 
member states. Four points are worth emphasising. 
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Figure 1. Russia's export capacity to Europe (2005-20) 
 
Data sources: IEA (2012a & 2012b) and the websites of Gazprom (www.gazprom.com) and Naftohaz 
(www.naftogaz.com). 
 
First, the EU has learned its lesson in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis. The Regulation on Gas 
Supply Security is revealing in this respect. Adopted a few months after the 2009 gas dispute, it 
strengthened the EU’s ability to respond to potential disruptions in gas supplies. Whilst the 
Regulation identified the internal gas market as the EU’s best tool for enhancing its security of 
supply, it also provided standards for increasing the market’s liquidity and interconnectivity. In 
this context, it requires all gas interconnectors between the member states to be equipped with 
reverse flow capabilities by the end of 2014, allowing gas flows to regions exposed to unwanted 
supply shocks. Moreover, the deployment of new infrastructure, in the form of reverse flows, 
storage sites and LNG facilities, has improved the supply-security of the internal gas market.  
Second, Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas supplies has been weakened because 
Russia diversified its gas export routes (see the figure above). Russia’s export capacities to the EU 
increased by 55 bcm annually when the Nord Stream pipeline, connecting Russia and Germany, 
became fully operational in 2012. Moreover, the acquisition of Beltransgaz late in 2011 allowed 
Gazprom to take control of the Belarusian GTS. With that move, Gazprom killed two birds with 
one stone. Not only did it gain another direct supply route to the EU, but it also got rid of the 
transit element for gas flowing through the Yamal pipeline. The Yamal-Europe pipeline 
transports Russian gas through Belarus into Poland and Germany and has an annual capacity of 
33 bcm. In the event of another crisis, if used at full capacity, the two supply corridors would 
allow Gazprom to inject up to 88 bcm per year, or 83% of total 2012 Russian exports1 into the EU 
gas system.  
In addition, the takeover of Beltransgaz and the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline 
allowed Gazprom to redirect gas flows destined for its customers located in Central and North-
Western Europe to these more convenient export routes. Consequently, countries like Poland, 
                                                   
1 The figure presenting the volume of Russian gas exports to the EU varies across sources. As reported by 
BP, in 2012, the EU member states purchased around 105 bcm of natural gas from Russia. According to 
statistics posted on the Gazprom website (www.gazprom.com), gas exports to Europe amounted to 
roughly 139 bcm in the same period of time. These differences stem from the fact that the figures presented 
by Gazprom also include exports to non-EU member states such as Turkey or Serbia.  
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Germany or France would be effectively shielded from potential disruptions in supplies of 
natural gas transiting Ukraine.  
Finally, a successful completion of the South Stream project (with its planned capacity of 63 bcm 
per year) could further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country. Currently under 
construction, the South Stream pipeline will ship Russian gas through the Black Sea into south-
eastern Europe. Whereas this development might be welcomed by Moscow and Brussels, it 
would nevertheless increase Gazprom’s market power in Europe. This is especially pertinent as 
the EU itself has embarked on a transition to hub-based pricing as the pricing mechanism for 
natural gas. As opposed to oil-indexation, the main price driver under this pricing mechanism is 
not the price of oil, but rather the market value of gas as a result of the equilibrium between 
supply and demand (for more, see Wieczorkiewicz, 2014). Indeed, if completed, the South Stream 
pipeline will augment Gazprom’s export capacity to the EU to a maximum of 269 bcm per year, 
largely exceeding the current volume of gas supplies flowing from Russia to the EU member 
states, which totalled some 105 bcm in 2012. Under a hub-based pricing mechanism, this spare 
capacity could allow Gazprom to increase gas supplies with the possible aim of influencing price 
levels at selected European hubs (e.g. making alternatives to Russian gas unprofitable).  
Further progress in the integration of the single gas market in the EU has reduced the 
vulnerability of the EU to disruptions of gas imports. However, new market rules are also 
influencing the behaviour of external gas suppliers. Most notably, we can observe the recent 
moves of Russia as it attempts to secure its long-term influence in the EU gas market. We should 
expect to see further strategic developments in EU gas supplies in the near future. 
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